The recent escalation between Israel and Iran signals not just another flare-up in a long-standing rivalry, but the unveiling of a new phase in international conflict, the rise of Threshold War. This mode of warfare, defined by its strategic ambiguity and refusal to cross the line into declared war, now intersects with the global architecture of nuclear technology control regimes, presenting a paradox with long-term consequences.
Undeclared Powers and Declared Intentions
One of the central ironies of the Israel-Iran conflict lies in their respective nuclear positions. Israel is widely acknowledged to be a non-declared nuclear power, maintaining a policy of ambiguity that has shielded it from international scrutiny. Iran, on the other hand, is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is subject to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite persistent Western concerns over its uranium enrichment activities.
The paradox is stark: a state with nuclear weapons and outside the NPT launches preventative strikes to prevent a signatory state (ostensibly complying with the treaty) from acquiring the technological capacity that could, theoretically, lead to a bomb. These strikes, while framed as deterrence, actually validate the strategic logic of acquiring nuclear weapons for the targeted state. If nothing else, they confirm that a state remains vulnerable without a credible nuclear deterrent.
Threshold War and the Illusion of Control
The concept of threshold warfare is designed to avoid the costs and visibility of total war, operating just below the line of open interstate conflict. In practice, this has led to a slow-motion normalisation of hostilities: cyberattacks, proxy warfare, assassinations, and missile strikes conducted with strategic deniability.
But these shadow wars have undermined the stability technology control regimes were meant to enforce. There is no legal barrier in the NPT against a state developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes, including uranium enrichment. Yet once a country crosses a certain technical threshold, it is subject to coercion or attack ... even if it remains within the boundaries of international law.
Thus, the pursuit of nuclear capability becomes a rational survival strategy, especially when preemptive (or preventative) strikes become a routine occurrence. This is not just a failure of diplomacy; it’s a failure of the architecture designed to contain nuclear risks.
The Strategic Backfire
Each preventative strike carries an unintended strategic message: only full nuclear deterrence can guarantee safety. The logic of nonproliferation is turned on its head when countries that forgo weaponisation are punished while nuclear-armed states are shielded from consequence.
Iran's position is illustrative. Its technological advances in enrichment, combined with its ambiguous posture on weaponisation, place it in a “nuclear latency” state. Israel’s preemptive operations, whether through airstrikes or cyber sabotage, are meant to prevent weaponisation. But the deeper consequence is that they make achieving a credible deterrent appear more urgent to Iranian strategists.
Reimagining Control in a Gray-Zone Era
What this crisis reveals is that current technology control regimes are not equipped for threshold warfare. They rely on binaries - weaponised or not, compliant or not - while modern conflict operates in shades of ambiguity. The tools of cyberwar, deniable sabotage, and indirect strikes do not fall neatly into treaty frameworks.
A new strategic doctrine must emerge; one that recognises the paradox of deterrence, and that accountability must apply even to undeclared powers. Without that, the message to the world remains: develop nuclear weapons quietly, or risk annihilation.
Conclusion
The Israel-Iran confrontation is not just a regional affair. It is a warning sign of systemic instability, driven by the mismatch between old doctrines and new realities. In an age where preemptive strikes risk justifying the very threats they aim to eliminate, the path forward must involve renewed commitment to equitable enforcement of treaties and a recognition that the future of global security lies in resolving paradoxes, not exploiting them.
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